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ABSTRACT
The RadFxSat mission was launched on November 18, 2017 with the Joint Polar Satellite System-1 (JPSS-1) under
the NASA ELaNa XIV initiative. RadFxSat, now designated at AO-91, is an AMSAT Fox bus carrying a Vanderbilt
University radiation effects payload. Embedded in the sub-audible range of voice transmissions are the telemetry
conveying the status of the spacecraft and payload. Since launch, hundreds of amateur radio operators have
elem software and are
being used by researchers to measure the effects of ionizing radiation on modern commercial electronics.
a constant threat to reliability and survivability from the
beginning of a mission until the end.

MISSION DESCRIPTION
In recent years, a number of investigators have
discovered that very advanced (scaled) memories are
susceptible to data corruption due to direct ionization
(as opposed to indirect) from protons.1-5 This process of
charge generation is typically not considered in
classical microelectronic error rate estimates. Protonrich environments such as low-Earth orbit and nearEarth solar particle events could drives error rates
beyond expected or acceptable levels. The relative
contribution of proton direct ionization to the total error
rate remains unresolved. RadFxSat was designed as part
of a campaign to quantify error rates in advanced
microelectronics and evaluate radiation modeling and
prediction methods. The mission was launched on
November 18, 2017 and is still operating. RadFxSat is
currently in an 815 km apogee, 453 km perigee orbit
with 97.7° inclination and 200° argument of perigee.

Corruption of data stored in a memory component is a
subclass of SEE known as single event upset (SEU).
These events occur because of the bistable nature of
charge storage devices like a static random access
memory (SRAM). Each bit of data in the integrated
chip is susceptible to flip if sufficient charge is
promptly introduced in its vicinity. The threshold for a
bit flip is known as the critical charge. The industry
trend in integrated circuits has been scaling to increase
transistor density and concurrently decreasing operating
voltages to reduce power. The side effect has been the
reduction of critical charge thresholds. Nanoelectronics,
or process technologies with physical features on the
order of several nanometers, have critical charges on
the order of femtocoulombs. The reduction has made
memory devices more susceptible corruption in
radiations environments.

RADIATION EFFECTS IN ELECTONICS
Ionizing radiation can have a variety of effects on
spacecraft electronics. The effects may be destructive or
degrading. They may also be permanent or transient. In
this paper, we will focus on one type of effect which is
non-destructive, transient, and random in nature. Single
event effects (SEE) occur when a particle strikes an
electronic device having a measurable impact on the
operation. This contrast to cumulative effects, such as
total ionizing dose or displacement damage, makes SEE

Single particles are capable of causing other single
event effects including latchup, functional interrupts, as
well as gate rupture and burnout in power devices. In
integrated circuits, single event latchup (SEL) may be
destructive. This run-away high-current condition
overheats and frequently damages electrical pathways.
Once latchup has occurred, the only relief is to remove
electrical power from the component to break the
feedback. Unfortunately, even after a successful power
cycle, latent damage may be hiding within the
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component. Single event functional interrupts (SEFI)
are another type of disruption to the nominal operation
of microelectronics but are associated with corruption
of control logic rather than an electrical dysfunction.
Charge generation from ionizing radiation is introduced
through direct and indirect processes. In direct
ionization, the primary charged particle loses energy
through electronic collisions along its trajectory. This is
known as the linear energy transfer (LET) of the
particle and is typically normalized to material density
to have units of MeV-cm2/mg. Ionized particles with
larger atomic mass (really higher charge states) will
result in larger LET. The energy loss is also energy
dependent; the highest rate of energy loss is near the
particle's end of range. For reference, ions in the space
environment can reach as high as 100 MeV-cm2/mg in
silicon. Iron, a dominant component of the LET
spectrum, has a maximum of 26 MeV-cm2/mg in
silicon. Direct ionization typically dominates ioninduced single event mechanisms. The process is
naturally directional, following the trajectory of the ion.
Therefore electronics, because of internal structures,
tend to exhibit angular dependence on the probability of
single event effects. Sensitive volume models have
been developed around this premise.6

Figure 1: Differential trapped proton spectra for
AO-91 with three aluminum shielding thicknesses
background, planetary radiation belts, or solar particle
events. The environments differ in the composition of
particle species, energies, flux, and even variability.
However, the random arrival of a single particle that
can cause impacts to the operation of a circuit means
that electronics cause experience an anomaly at any
point in the mission.
The space radiation environment and its effects are
fairly well known today. In fact, the aerospace
community has developed ways to address these issues.
One hardening strategy is the simple solution of
radiation shielding. While this approach can be very
effective for low-energy particles, it becomes less
useful for the higher energy portion of the environment.
To eliminate the remaining risk, the traditional
approach has been to use electronic parts that are
intentionally hardened to the space environment by
design or technology selection. High-budget missions
have the luxury of funding and using radiation hardened
devices when required. This part selection can be very
limited and costly for amateur or low-cost missions. As
a result, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) electronics
are appealing to designers as an avenue to reduce mass,
volume, power, and ultimately the cost of launching
and operating the satellite. In some cases, automotive or
even commercial-grade electronics may prove
sufficient.

Protons, however, have a maximum LET of 0.5 MeVcm2/mg in silicon at their end of the range. At higher
energies, charge generated from electronic stopping is
negligible. At energies above a few MeV, protons
ionize through indirect processes. Coulombic and
nuclear scatters within a component result in shortrange recoils. Nuclear fragmentation generates
secondary products, commonly through interactions
with silicon and oxygen atoms because of their
abundance in electronics. Both recoils and secondary
products have larger atomic numbers than the primary
proton and less energy. As a result, the secondary
particles "indirectly" deposit a significant portion of the
primary particle's energy. The direction of secondary
production is largely isotropic so proton single event
effects typically do not exhibit angular dependence. The
necessary nuclear interaction reduces the probability of
occurrence.

Therefore we are left with addressing the questions of
how severe are the radiation effects and how often will
they happen. The radiation hardness assurance process
must make predictions of on-orbit part performance
based on information obtained on the ground. This
typically involves the use of an irradiator or particle
accelerator. However both have limitations. A handful
of results from ground-based tests using a limited set of
particle energies, ranges, and angles must be
extrapolated to the full environment of space using
models.

Two approaches have developed to independently
assess ion-induced and proton-induced single event
effects. Unfortunately, the reduction of critical charge
thresholds below a few femtocoulomb introduces the
direct ionization process into proton-induced SEU. If
ignored, missions risk unexpectedly high error rates.
MITIGATING AND PREDICTING SEE
In space, ionizing radiation capable of causing single
event effects originates from the galactic cosmic ray
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Figure 3: RadFxSat (AO-91) CAD Model
(Courtesy of AMSAT)

Figure 2: RadFxSat (AO-91) cubesat
(Courtesy of AMSAT)
Cosmic Ray Effects on Microelectronics (CREME96)6
has been used for over 20 years to assess single events.
The suite consists of models for calculating the on-orbit
radiation environment including trapped protons, the
effects of geomagnetic shielding, solar particle events,
and galactic cosmic rays. Simple shielding transport
and proton dose calculations can be included. Further,
for microelectronics with ground test data, single event
rate calculations can be performed.

in Figure 3. The avionics stack, from top to bottom, is
listed in Table 1. The satellite utilizes six solar panels
with two Spectrolab Ultra Triple Junction cells per
panel. Each panel supplies current to six maximum
power point trackers (MPPT) on the power board
designed by Rochester Institute of Technology. The
battery card includes six NiCad cells providing a
nominal 3.6 V. The Internal Housekeeping Unit (IHU)
executes commands from ground control, interfaces
with the science payload, collects the system telemetry,
and sends the telemetry as sub-audible FSK to the
radio. This board is built with an ST Microelectronics
STM32L running FreeRTOS. The RF Rx card provides
audio to the IHU and RF Tx. is connected to a 70 cm
whip antenna. The RF Tx card provides audio
processing using inputs from the RF Rx and IHU and
transmits with a 2 meter antenna. The structure
provides passive attitude control with bar magnets and
hysteresis rods on the battery card for damping. This
aligns the satellite's z-axis with the Earth's magnetic
field.

Figure 1 shows the differential energy spectrum of the
trapped proton environment of RadFxSat computed by
CREME96 under solar minimum and geomagnetic
quiet conditions. Three aluminum shielding thicknesses
were evaluated to demonstrate the effect on the incident
environment. In RadFxSat, the payload is shielded by a
solar panel in the positive Z direction and the spacecraft
bus in the negative Z direction. Near 1 MeV, protons
have sufficient energy to penetrate component
packaging and cause single event upsets.
SPACECRAFT OVERVIEW
RadFxSat was developed as a collaboration between
Vanderbilt University and the Radio Amateur Satellite
Corporation (AMSAT). This CubeSat is the second
design in the AMSAT Fox Project. The first
collaboration was the AO-85 CubeSat.7 The Fox project
pursued a path to put ham radio transponders into space
and at the same time provide university partners with a
satellite bus for space-based research.8 Students and
faculty at Vanderbilt University provided the radiation
effects experimental payload for integration by
AMSAT into the full avionics stack.

Table 1: RadFxSat Avionics Stack
Board

RadFxSat, also known as Fox-1B, is shown in Figure 2
with a CAD rendering of the printed circuit board stack
Sierawski
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Function

REM4

Radiation Experiment (0.85V)

REM3

Radiation Experiment (0.5V)

REM2

Radiation Experiment (0.5V)

VUC

Vanderbilt University Controller

BATT

Battery Card

MPPT

Maximum Power Point Tracker

IHU

Internal Housekeeping Unit

RF Rx

FM receiver

RF Tx

FM transmitter
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EXPERIMENT DESIGN
The REM experiment was designed to monitor single
event effects in a 28 nm SRAM. The memory is a test
chip provided in-kind by Broadcom Corporation and
can be seen as the large package in the bottom image of
Figure 4. The limited space available on the printed
circuit board dictated that the memory be attached to
the back side where as the majority of components
reside on the front. The memory, like the other
components, was not designed to operate in space. The
results, however, teach us about modeling radiation
effects in commercial-off-the-shelf components. Onorbit single event data are normalized, but should not
be taken as an indication of terrestrial reliability as the
environments have significant differences. Futher, the
experiment is designed in ways to gather statistically
significant numbers of events necessary for modeling.
For example, no error detection and correction methods
are applied and the memories can be operated at
reduced bias.
The SRAM is used only as the device under test and
serves no functional purpose within the satellite. The
experiment proceeds by initializing the entire memory
to a known data pattern. Then the memory is left to
store the data for five minutes. After this period of
exposure to the natural radiation environment, the
memory is scanned for bit errors. Each instance of an
error is tallied and recorded within an off-chip counter.
In this way the accumulated error count is recorded and
eventually transmitted reducing the need to maintain a
history or continuously monitor errors. In addition to
the total error count, registers recording the total
livetime are incremented. The ratio of the error counts
and livetime yield the device error rate. An general, the
device error rate is dependent on the number of bits
exposed, which is known, but unpublished. After the
scan is complete, the SRAM is reinitialized and
prepared to conduct another exposure.

Figure 4: Front-side (top) and back-side (bottom)
of 28 nm SRAM board on RadFxSat.
ground. Each call to the FreeRTOS task evaluates a
transition in a software state machine. The registers of
this state machine are stored off-chip in a non-volatile
FRAM which was demonstrated to be proton-induced
single event tolerant. In this way, the microcontroller
may experience single event effects and even reset
without interruption to the experiment data. Although
computation and data must eventually reside in the
microcontroller, we limit its use to local variables
which quickly go out of scope and prohibit global
variables that could adversely affect the experiment
operation. Further, all control registers are treated as
volatile in the sense that the code may not assume flags
have remained set between function calls, etc.

Nominal operation for the SRAM is between 0.9 and
1.1V. However, the design is capable of lowering the
core voltage as low as 0.3 V to reduce static power
consumption and still retaining data. During each
exposure the core voltage is set to either 0.5 V or 0.85
V. Each bias condition utilizes a different set of error
and livetime registers.
Each experiment is controlled by a Microchip PIC24FJ
microcontroller. Each microcontroller on the RadFxSat
payload runs experiment software adapted for its
particular board. The software is built with FreeRTOS
tasks. The microcontroller is responsible for conducting
the experiment, reading and writing the SRAM,
signaling the remaining components providing the
adjustable bias and providing a telemetry string to the
RadFxSat flight computer for transmission to the
Sierawski
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PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION
The experiment payload on RadFxSat is called Phoenix.
This consists of three REM boards and a Vanderbilt
University Controller (VUC) to coordinate the
operations between experiments, provide power, and
communicate with the bus. Each experiment is
configured to run the SRAM at a different bias
condition. In this case, two were selected to run at 0.5V
because of the primary objective of characterizing low
critical charge operation. The payload stack is shown as
the top four boards in Figure 3. The exterior panels are
omitted. From top to bottom are the REM4 (0.85V),
REM3 (0.5V), REM2 (0.5V), and VUC.
Late in the development process it was determined that
running all three experiment boards would exceed the
payload power budget. Attempts to reduced board-level
power consumption were insufficient. The solution was
to use the VUC to cycle power between experiments
allowing one to run while the other two remain
powered off. Provisions were included to ensure the
VUC switched between the experiments after several
days of operation. This allows each experiment to
effectively average its results over multiple orbits. At
the same time, experiments are not run so long as to
experience large precession in the orbit.

Figure 5: Partial assurance case used to document
and review the radiation hardness assurance of the
REM experiment
vulnerable to single event latchup unless demonstrated
otherwise. As mentioned previous, latchup is a
potentially destructive event. Voltage regulators and
current limiting is implemented separately for the
memory and all other components. Similar components
had been previously demonstrated to be proton single
event tolerant. All components were screened for total
ionizing dose. A complete description of the hardness
assurance was previously published.9

LESSONS LEARNED
Beyond the required shock and vibration tests, we have
found temperature testing boards to be good practice.
Thermal tests of the boards and the integrated system
were completed over a temperature range of -55°C to
85°C using a TestEquity 140 temperature chamber. At
elevated temperatures, the payload static power
increased as expected. However, a number of issues
were identified with power monitoring and restart
circuitry at the temperature extremes and even within
nominal on-orbit temperatures (~ 0 to -10°C). In
particular, at cold temperatures, certain components in
the system were found to continuously restart due to the
unintentional combination of parameters in the SEL
management circuits and inrush current properties of
several of the components. The cold temperature
enhancement of switching speeds produced currents
comparable with trigger levels designed to mitigate
anomalous behaviors. The issues were resolved through
a design modification and the system performed as
designed over the full temperature range.

Further, an assurance case was constructed at the
component level for the radiation reliability of the REM
experiment.10,11 An assurance case is a graphical
argument amenable to model based systems
engineering that allows one to make a qualitative
argument. This approach allowed for documentation
and review of part test results and system mitigation
approaches. The argument was based on the objectives
outlined in NASA STD 8729.1A.12 The assurance case
focused on radiation effects including total ionizing
dose screening, detection and recovery from single
event latchup, and restart following single event
functional interrupts. A complete assurance case
includes a series of interconnected objectives,
strategies, assumptions, and evidence. A portion of the
assurance case is shown in Figure 5. For the REM
experiment, where reliability approaches include the
system design and not radiation hardened parts, the
assurance case provides an effective format to evaluate
risk.
Sierawski
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Science data are also accessible through the FoxTelem
interface. Each of the experiments returns a telemetry
string when powered on and are presented in Figure 8.
The top box indicates the number of microcontroller
resets, the uptime of the microcontroller, current SRAM
core voltage, and the cumulative SRAM livetime and
bit errors.

FOXTELEM
The Fox series of Cubesats have a FoxTelem software
package to demodulate, store, and analyze telemetry.13
The software is freely available for download from
https://www.amsat.org/foxtelem-software-for-windowsmac-linux/ The decoder is implemented in Java
therefore can be used on Windows, Mac & Linux
platforms. FoxTelem can decode telemetry stored as a
wav file or acquired through the sound card and display
the associated data frames. Slow speed data, or data
under voice, transmits 200 bps data in the sub audible
band of the transponder. Data are constructed as a 58
byte frame with a header. Real-time health is displayed
in Figure 6. FoxTelem also simplifies the process to
upload your telemetry to the AMSAT server and
download the entire telemetry set. Each of the telemetry
values can be plotted over time by clicking on the field.
The temperature at the IHU computer, for instance, can
be displayed as show in Figure 7.

All science data are based on telemetry collected by
amateur radio operators and submitted through
FoxTelem. The coordinates of the ground stations, for
gauging participation only, can be placed by selfidentified call signs on the AMSAT leaderboard and
home station identified in the QRZ database.14 The
map, shown in Figure 9, of course does not accurately
account for unidentified contributors or mobile
operators. Each marker indicates the number of frames
reported on a logarithmic scale with red indicating the
maximum at over 235,000.

Figure 8: Experiment board real time telemetry in
FoxTelem

Figure 6: Fox Health shows real time telemetry

Figure 9: Location of amateur radio operator
ground stations
Figure 7: RadFxSat computer temperature
telemetry plotted in FoxTelem
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ON-ORBIT SCIENCE DATA
18 months of telemetry have been collected since the
launch of RadFxSat. The data provide a picture of the
single event rate for bit errors. As described previously,
the REM experiments report cumulative counts. Figure
10 plots the cumulative bit errors recorded by the
experiment for each of the three REM boards. The
interleaving of the data sets are a result of power
cycling between boards. Periods without data at the
beginning of the mission are a result of commissioning
and a payload functional interrupt remedied in July
2018.
Typically, errors affect a single bit and are infrequent
for the capacity of memory tested. However, REM3
recorded a large jump in errors at the end of March
2018. Plausible explanations include a particle strike to
read/write peripheral circuitry or data corruption in the
microcontroller. The event is doubly-suspect as the
error count resumes at 64, a power of two. Focusing on
the data collected after July 2018 provides a better
sense of the frequency of bit errors.

Figure 10: Cumulative bit errors reported in REM
experiments
Table 2: Mission Averaged Error Rates
Board

The reduced counts in REM4 cannot be attributed to
additional shielding as it was located at the top of the
board stack. Rather, the SRAM core voltage on REM4
was held at 0.85 V instead of 0.5 V as was done on
REM2 and REM3. This is qualitatively consistent with
the bias dependence of ion-induced single event upset
cross sections.15 The device error rate (upsets/hr) is
derived as the ratio of errors to the experiment livetime.
Table 2 summaries the total values reported at the
beginning of June 2019.

Error
Counts

Livetime
(hr)

Normalized
Error Rate

REM4

16

1265

0.013

REM3

132

4110

0.032

REM2

91

3781

0.024

Adjusted for April 2018 anomaly

present a cheap alternative to ground-based test
campaigns. Rather, the program is an effort to gather
data to validate radiation hardness assurance
approaches and models. In particular, we are interested
in the continued effects of microelectronic scaling on
the radiation reliability. The program has had three
successful launches, but unfortunately Fox-1C suffered
an anomaly with its radio and cannot be commanded.
Future launches will investigate single event upsets in a
highly-scaled FinFET process technology.

The RadFxSat mission was only one in a series of
radiation effects studies enabled by CubeSats. Table 3
summaries past and future launches. The goal of the
program is not to qualify or even characterize candidate
parts for spaceflight. Considering the unsubsidized cost
of launch and development, on-orbit experiments do not

Table 3: RadFx Mission Summary
Design

Description

Status

Fox1-A

Investigates single event upsets in 8 identical 4Mbit commercially-available
SRAMs

AO-85 launched Oct. 8, 2015
(completed 3 years operation)

Fox1-B

Investigates single event upsets across bias in 3 identical 28 nm commercial test
chips.

AO-91 launched Nov. 18, 2017
(operational)

Fox1-C (Fox1-A
flight spare)

Investigates single event upsets in 8 identical 4Mbit commercially-available
SRAMs.

AO-95 launched Dec. 3, 2018
(communication failure)

Fox1-E

Investigates single event upsets across technology including 16nm FinFET
SRAM

Planned launch Q3 2019

GOLF-TEE

Investigates single event upsets in 16nm FinFET SRAM

Planned launch 2020
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